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Appellants hereby submit the following Supplemental Briefing to address the 
questions posed by the Court (restated in bold font). 
I. DEFINE THE CONTOURS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS THE 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ASSERTING IN THIS CASE BY OUTLINING THE 
FOLLOWING: 
A What right or rights arise under the Utah State Constitution that the 
Jensens claim have been violated in this case? Please include any case 
law, statute, or historical evidence to support the assertion of this right. 
The Jensens claim that the following rights have been violated: 
1. The right to direct their child's medical care free from governmental 
interference, unless such interference is narrowly tailored and in 
furtherance of a compelling state interest. 
The Court has already expressly recognized this right under Art. I, § 7. In In re 
J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373, the Court wrote: 
The integrity of the family and the parents' inherent right and authority to 
rear their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-
American culture, presupposed by all our social, political, and legal institutions. 
"To protect the (individual) in his constitutionally guaranteed right to form and 
preserve the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government 
is established ...." "The family is the basis of our society." "The family entity is 
the core element upon which modern civilization is founded." "This primary role 
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate 
as an enduring American tradition." 
This parental right transcends all property and economic rights. It is rooted 
not in state or federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and 
chronologically prior, but in nature and human instinct. Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court has declared that "the liberty interest in family privacy has its 
source ... in intrinsic human rights...." 
Similarly, this Court has stated that the parent's right, as well as duty, to 
care for a child "may be termed natural, as well as legal and moral." More 
recently, this Court has spoken of "the natural right and authority of the parent to 
the child's custody," and of "the prior and fundamental right of a parent to rear his 
child....". 
1 
Id. at 1373-1374 (citations omitted).1 
In summarizing its holding in J.P., this Court stated in Wells v. Children's AidSoc. 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984): 
In re J.P., supra, identified parental rights as "fundamental" for purposes of 
due process. 648 P.2d at 1372-74. In the context of alleged vagueness in statutory 
language, we have held that "[w]hen state action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly define the scope of permissible 
conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." In re Boyer, Utah, 
636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981). Similarly, "to avoid unwarranted intrusion" on the 
fundamental rights of parenthood we hold that Utah's Due Process Clause requires 
a higher level of scrutiny than is exercised to determine the validity of economic 
regulation. By analogy to the tests employed in judging the validity of alleged 
infringements on other fundamental rights, we hold that the proponent of 
legislation infringing parental rights must show (1) a compelling state interest in 
the result to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to 
achieve the basic statutory purpose." Id. at 1090. 
It has thus been settled in Utah since at least 1981 that it violates Art. I, § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution for a state actor to interfere with the fundamental parental right of 
rearing one's child - which would include the essential role of directing the child's 
medical care, see, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003)-
unless the state actor can meet the burden of showing that such interference was 
"narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling state interest." 
1
 The Court further observed: "We deal here with a fundamental principle. The 
Constitution of Utah declares, 'Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.' Article I, § 27. 
The cornerstone of democratic government is the conviction that governments exist at the 
sufferance of the people, in whom 4(a)ll political power is inherent....' Utah Const. Art. I, 
§ 2. A residuum of liberty reposes in the people. That liberty is not limited to the exercise 
of rights specifically enumerated in either the United States or the Utah Constitutions. 
Thus, Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution states, 'This enumeration of rights shall not 
be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.'" In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 
1372-73. 
2 
There are no Utah cases in which the parties raised Art. I § 1 in the parent-child 
context. However, the Court has recognized that certain freedoms guaranteed under the 
Utah Constitution originate from more than one textual provision. See American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, If 17, 140 P.3d 1235 (The "framers of the Utah 
Constitution divided the freedom of speech guarantees into three distinct clauses" in Art. 
I §§ 1 and 2). "[Constitutional interpretation!] [] dictate[s] that when determining the 
meaning of a constitutional provision, 'other provisions dealing generally with the same 
topic ... assist us in arriving at a proper interpretation of the constitutional provision in 
question.5" Id. at f^ 18, quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866-67 (Utah 1996). 
Since article I, section 1 and article I, section 15 are both directed toward 
expression, it is entirely appropriate, in fact necessary, that we construe 
these two provisions together. Indeed, this court has specifically held that 
"article I, section 15 must be read in conjunction with other constitutional 
provisions ... [including] [t]he opening provision of the Utah Constitution." 
West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added); see also Redding v. Brady, 606 
P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1980) (construing article I, section 1 and article I, 
section 15 in concert). 
Id. at K 18; see also Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (state's due 
process clause should be read with clause recognizing inherent rights of enjoying life and 
liberty and pursuing happiness, which rights include "the right to establish and maintain a 
home and family relations"). 
In this case, §§1 and 7 are both directed toward guaranteeing and preserving 
individual rights and liberties, and may be read together when construing the Jensens5 
rights under the Utah Constitution. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670, 675 
(Utah 1985); State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P. 388, 389 (1903). 
3 
Moreover, application of In re J.P. and Wells to § 1 requires nothing more than 
application of plain language. "Liberty" within § 1 is not just the absence of physical 
restraint, but "a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not only freedom from 
servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but also all our 
religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 
22, 24 (1904); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964) (The right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, "and as a corresponding and accompanying right, 
the right to privacy in his own home/' is a "just claim, God given, or innate as a human"). 
Section 1 expressly states that the inherent rights of defending life and liberty are 
guaranteed, and In re J.P. and Wells expressly state that the right to rear one's child is 
one of those inherent rights. See also 16A CJ.S. § 377 (summarizing other states' 
interpretations of inalienable rights provision as guaranteeing enjoyment of domestic 
relations and privileges of the family and the home, and protection of one's health). 
2. The right to follow medical recommendations of a licensed physician 
of their choosing, unless the State can establish that the 
recommendations are substantially below the norm. 
Concomitant with the right to direct medical care is the right to follow the 
recommendations of a licensed physician in whom the parents have confidence. A state 
actor cannot interfere with, or penalize the parent for, choosing that physician instead of 
one whom the state considers "better". To do so is to impose a standard of comparative 
fitness on the parents, which this Court has long recognized as prohibited by Art. I, § 7. 
See Brief of Appellant at pp. 47-48, and 51-56 (citing cases, historical support, statutes, 
4 
and commentary). Every court in the United States to address this concept in the context 
of medical care has reached the same conclusion. See Brief of Appellants at 52-57. 
3. The right not to be reported to the State for neglect because the 
parents are seeking confirmation of a diagnosis before implementing 
a state actor's medical recommendations. 
When a right is guaranteed under the constitution, it is as much interference to 
penalize a parent for exercising the right as it is to prevent such exercise. Stated 
differently, accusing a parent of neglect for exercising the right to direct medical care 
guaranteed by Art. I, §§ 1 and 7 is itself a violation of those constitutional guarantees. 
This principle is not only inherent, but also follows from the plain language of Art. I, § 1, 
which guarantees the right to "defend" life and liberty. 
4, The right to an investigation of the reporting party's allegations 
before being forced to defend against State efforts to transfer 
custody in order to impose medical procedures on a child. 
The statutory prerequisites for interference with a family by DCFS employees 
codify constitutional minima: 
(1) (a) Courts have recognized a general presumption that it is in the best 
interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision 
of his natural parents. A child's need for a normal family life in a 
permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships will 
usually best be met by his natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the 
family unit, and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children 
have found protection in the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right of a fit. 
2
 The only exception is if the state actor can demonstrate that the physician's 
recommendations equate to "substantial" neglect. In this case, all medical witnesses 
(except defendant Wagner) agree that seeking confirmation of a diagnosis with reliable, 
inexpensive, and available genetic / molecular testing is a reasonable request. 
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competent parent to raise his child has long been protected by the laws and 
Constitution of this state and of the United States. 
(b) It is the public policy of this state that parents retain the fundamental 
right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision, 
upbringing, and education of their children who are in their custody. 
U.C.A. § 62A-4a-201(l)(2003)(emphasis added). 
The Jensens were entitled to a "thorough pre-removal investigation" upon DCFS's 
receipt of a report of child abuse or neglect. See U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a) (2003); Utah 
Admin. R. 512-201-1 & 201-4 (2003) (child protective services caseworker must 
complete an "accurate and timely investigation"). Absent an investigation, no argument 
can be made that a parent had received "due" or fair process, or that submitting an 
affidavit containing misrepresentations is narrowly tailored conduct. Moreover, statutory 
requirements of an investigation not only reflect constitutional standards, but also create a 
protected liberty interest in themselves. See, e.g., Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931 
P.2d 147, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing liberty interest for purposes of Art. I, § 7 in 
statutory parole grant process). A party cannot be deprived under §§1 and 7 except by 
means that are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 
5. The right to be free from proceedings to transfer custody that are 
tainted by reckless or intentional material misrepresentations or 
omissions by state actors. 
A parent's entitlement under Art. I, § 7 to a procedurally sound involvement with 
DCFS and the juvenile court has long been established in Utah. Wells, supra at 204, and 
cases cited; Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 
1982); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982). "The general test for the validity of 
6 
such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Wells, at 204. As a matter of 
law and common sense, the making of misrepresentations cannot be narrowly tailored 
conduct, nor "due" process. See Brief of Appellants at 46-47, 50. 
6. The right to be free from unreasonable custodial and non-custodial 
seizures. 
The right to be free from unreasonable seizures is explicitly stated in Art. I, § 14. 
By definition, a seizure resulting from culpable material misrepresentations or omissions 
cannot be "reasonable." Similarly, § 14's requirement that seizures be based upon 
probable cause "supported by oath or affirmation" cannot be satisfied if a state actor's 
oath or affirmation is false. Additional historical context for the Framers' intent to 
protect residents from false statements is set forth in the Brief of Appellants at pp. 58-60. 
That the Framers expected the rights guaranteed under § 14 to extend to non-
custodial seizures is equally undeniable. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 60-62. 
B. What specific action or actions taken by each defendant do the 
plaintiffs allege violated those rights? Please include a separate 
paragraph or section for each individual defendant. 
Pursuant to the Court's directive to avoid repeating factual assertions, the Jensens' 
earlier fact statements are incorporated herein. Actions that the Jensens contend were 
violative - in their totality or individually - with exemplar record citations include: 
1. Defendant Wagner 
Wagner recklessly and/or intentionally3 made material factual misrepresentations 
and omissions (hereinafter "made misrepresentations") to DCFS in order to induce DCFS 
3
 The Jensens' claims do not require "deliberate" misconduct; recklessness would suffice. 
7 
to seek a transfer of custody. (R.R.3407-11, 2306 2365, 3395, 3398, 2139-41, 2417-18, 
2422-23, 2429.) Wagner made similar misrepresentations to the juvenile court through 
an affidavit in order to induce a transfer of custody and the forcing of chemotherapy on 
Parker. (R. 3156-57, 3607-09.) Wagner made misrepresentations to co-workers and a 
supervisor, who would have honored the Jensens' request for diagnostic testing had they 
known of it. (R.2751-53, 2758-59, 2763, 3411, 1879, 1881, 1904-05, 1910-11, 1879-80, 
3378-79, 3396-97.) 
Wagner prevented a pre-referral meeting between the Jensens, Wagner, Dr. 
Corwin (an independent liaison), and the Jensens' chosen physician (Moore) by falsely 
telling Corwin that Parker's condition could not wait another 3 days. (R. 3396-97, 2429.) 
Wagner interfered with the Jensens' request for independent confirmation by contacting 
and attempting to influence the reviewing physician at Dana Farber. (R.2306, 2365, 
2369-71, 3427-28.) Wagner reported the Jensens to the state for medical neglect because 
they informed PCMC that they were going to go elsewhere to seek confirmation of the 
diagnosis. (R.2412.) 
2. Defendant Cunningham 
Cunningham failed or refused to conduct any investigation of the medical neglect 
allegations (let alone the required investigation), taking no steps to investigate after 
receiving the report from the accusing party. (R. 1919-21, 3431-32, 1876, 1891, 1892-94, 
1906, 1922-23, 3431, 1884, 1560-61.)4 For the purpose of initiating and later 
4
 Cunningham has argued that she was excused from performing an investigation because 
she was told by Wagner that it was an emergency. While Wagner has not conceded such, 
8 
perpetuating the juvenile court proceedings, Cunningham submitted one verified petition 
and two affidavits that she admits presented only the State's side of the story and 
contained misleading information. (R. 3435-51, 3440-46, 1893-93, 1903-04.) 
Cunningham issued a finding that the medical neglect allegations were "supported" 
despite having conducted no investigation. (R.3344-45, 1892-94.) Cunningham did not 
consider letting the Jensens rely on a physician of their choosing (Moore) because she 
accepted the reporting doctor's assertion that Moore was not "qualified" to treat Parker. 
(R.1883, 1913-14.) When submitting an affidavit to obtain a transfer of custody, 
Cunningham knew and did not disclose that the "controlling" test results were not in yet. 
(R.2863.) 
3. Defendant Anderson 
Anderson imposed a standard of comparative fitness on the Jensens, taking the 
position that, if there were conflicting opinions between a parent's physician and a 
physician upon whom the State is relying, the parents could not make the choice; instead, 
DCFS could force the parents into court and have the court decide "the more credible or 
the best treatment that is going to happen from the recommendation of the State or the 
parents." (R.1678.) Similarly, Anderson refused to authorize the dismissal of the neglect 
proceedings unless Parker was placed in the care of a board-certified pediatric oncologist. 
(R. 1577-78.) Anderson refused to include additional diagnostic testing as part of DCFS's 
even under the emergency guidelines, Cunningham was required to "meet with the 
parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary compliance with medical treatment pending or in 
lieu of court involvement, and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal to 
treat," (R. 3431-32), none of which she did. Indeed, Cunningham never ran allegations 
of neglect by PCMC past any other doctor. (R. 1870-71.) 
9 
pursuit of the medical neglect allegations unless the Jensens agreed to place Parker in 
foster care. (R.2587-88.) Anderson knew and did not disclose that the Idaho physician 
was not honoring a court-entered stipulation by waiting until test results were back before 
making a recommendation. (R. 1601.) 
4. Defendant Eisenman 
Eisenman made misrepresentations to the juvenile court in order to perpetuate the 
proceedings and to obtain warrants, a transfer of custody, and forced chemotherapy. (R. 
2545-47, 3508-09, 2370-71, 1980-82, 1991, 2863, 2026.) Eisenman made 
misrepresentations to her supervisor for the purpose of perpetuating the juvenile court 
proceedings. (R.3042-43, 3045-47, 3049, 3053-54.) Eisenman told the Jensens that she 
would not allow the Jensens to use Dr. Birkmayer because he was not licensed in the 
United States, when she knew that the State could not legally prohibit parents from taking 
their child to another country for medical treatment. (R.3507, 1987-89.) Eisenman 
performed a skewed investigation. (R.3535, 1990-91, 1490-91.) Eisenman made 
misrepresentations to the District Attorney's office that caused the filing of felony 
charges, upon which Daren Jensen was arrested and Daren and Barbara Jensen were 
seized. (R.2928, 1946, 3485-86.) 
5. Defendant Albritton 
Albritton made misrepresentations to the juvenile court in order to perpetuate the 
proceedings, impose a comparative fitness standard on the Jensens, and induce forced 
medication on Parker. (R.1943, 2024-25, 2012, 2863, 1488, 1512, 1980-81.) 
10 
II. DESCRIBE WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT GIVE 
RISE TO THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE OR ARE NOT SELF-
EXECUTING BY APPLYING THE TEST WE ESTABLISHED IN 
SPACEMAN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOX ELDER COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 2000 UT 87,16 P.3d 533. 
In Spackman, this Court held that Art. I §7 is self-executing. 2000 UT 87, ^ j 10 (§ 
7). Under the Spackman analysis, §§1 and 14 are also self-executing. "In essence, a 
self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be judicially enforced without 
implementing legislation." Id. f^ 7. "[I]f the framers intended the provision to have 
immediate effect and if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right 
given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed, the provision is self-executing." Id., 
quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996)(internal citations omitted). 
In determining that § 7 is self-executing, the Spackman court first recognized that 
it is prohibitory. In addition to its wording ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law") the Court noted that "the Utah Constitution 
states that all of its provisions are 'mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words 
they are declared to be otherwise.' Utah Const., art. I, § 26," and § 7 does not contain 
any such declaration.5 
Section 1 likewise contains no declaration rebutting the presumption that it is 
mandatory and prohibitory, and has been recognized by this Court as prohibitory. Block, 
76 P. at 24 (§ 1 "forbids the abridgement" of rights). Section 14 is prohibitory by its 
language ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
5
 The presumption that constitutional provisions are mandatory and prohibitory also 
exists at common law. See Davidson v. G. F. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 658 (Colo. 2004, 
En Banc), and cases cited. 
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effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation . . . ."), and there is 
no declaration rebutting the constitutional presumption. 
The Spackman court next observed that, "although the right to due process [in § 7] 
is expressed in relatively general terms, it is both judicially definable and enforceable. 
Indeed, this court has already defined and enforced the clause on numerous occasions 
without implementing legislation." 2000 UT 87, ^  12. 
Section 1 has been defined and applied by this Court numerous times without 
implementing legislation. See, e.g., Saville v. Cor less, 46 Utah 495, 151 P. 51, 52 (1915); 
Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937); Ritholz v. City of Salt 
Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613, 
618 (Utah App. 1993); Block, 76 P. at 24-26 (§§ 1 and 7 "are constitutional guaranties"); 
see also Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C, 684 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting 
similar inalienable rights clause in Iowa's state constitution as "not a mere glittering 
generality without substance or meaning," holding that it was intended to be judicially 
enforced), and cases cited.6 
6
 Utah's "inalienable rights" provision has appeared in each version of the state 
constitution, beginning with the 1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret. A persuasive 
argument has been made that the 1849 Constitution was drafted by the Council of Fifty of 
the LDS Church. See Peter Crawley, "The Constitution of the State of Deseret," 29 
BYU Studies 4:7 (1989). Whether that occurred or (as the official story went) it was 
drafted at a territorial convention, many of its drafters had recently arrived from Iowa. 
Id. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was modeled after Iowa's constitution. Kenneth R. 
Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 14," 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 267, 274 (1991). 
12 
Art. I § 14 has also been defined and applied numerous times by this Court, 
perhaps more than any other state constitutional provision. See, e.g., State v. Roybal, 
2010 UT 34, If 2, — P.3d —; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (1994); State v. Thompson, 810 
P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991); State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978). 
III. DISCUSS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MONEY DAMAGES FOR THE 
ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY APPLYING THE 
THREE PART TEST WE ARTICULATED IN SPACKMAN. 
EVALUATION UNDER THIS TEST WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS OF THE 
FOLLOWING: 
a) Was there a flagrant violation? 
b) Were other remedies available? 
c) Were equitable remedies adequate to redress the Jensens' 
injuries? 
A. Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations 
In Spackman, § 23, this Court explained that a "flagrant" constitutional violation 
essentially 
means that a defendant must have violated "clearly established" 
constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1982). To be considered clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right 
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). 
In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a right as clearly established, it "does not 
mean that there must be a published case involving identical facts; otherwise [courts] 
would be required to 'find qualified immunity wherever we have a new fact pattern.5 
Instead, 'a general constitutional rule can apply with obvious clarity to the specific 
conduct in question, even though such conduct has not previously been held unlawful.5" 
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York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2008) {quoting Casey v. City 
of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal citations omitted).7 
In Hope v. Pelzer, the United States Supreme Court emphasized: 
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has been held unlawful, but it is to say that in 
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). "Hope thus shifted the qualified immunity analysis from a scavenger 
hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts toward the more relevant inquiry of 
whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was 
unconstitutional." Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). 
If conduct has been addressed in case law, or is inherently or obviously wrong, or 
violates the plain wording of a constitutional provision, a defendant is on fair notice. (As 
an example of the latter, if a jury were to find that defendant Wagner reported the Jensens 
because they insisted on verifying the diagnosis before subjecting their child to life-
altering chemotherapy - defending their child's "life and liberty" - it would be a 
violation of the plain language of Art. I § 1.) 
When a determination of flagrancy depends upon the resolution of underlying fact, 
this element cannot be determined as a matter of law. See Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, 
7
 The recognition that some actions are obviously improper is perhaps analogous to the 
common law's recognition that while some actions are criminalized by virtue of statute 
{malum prohibitum), some are just plain wrong {malum in se). State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 
190, 407 P.2d 571, 574 (1965). 
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TI 28, 184 P.3d 592 (dispute of fact regarding the defendant's conduct precluded finding 
as a matter of law of whether it was flagrant). 
The settled, inherent, or obvious nature of each of the constitutional rights at issue 
in this case has largely been incorporated in the discussion of those rights above, pp. 1-7. 
All five of the state actor defendants were on notice that making material 
misrepresentations to a court, or to others to induce or facilitate court proceedings, was 
wrongful, particularly in the context of interference with a fundamental parent-child 
relationship. 
No reasonable official could believe that such conduct is narrowly tailored, or that 
it affords "due" process, or that it is reasonable. See, e.g., Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1298 ("The 
actions of a police forensic analyst who prevaricates and distorts evidence to convince the 
prosecuting authorities to press charges is no less reprehensible than an officer who, 
through false statements, prevails upon a magistrate to issue a warrant. In each case the 
government official maliciously abuses a position of trust to induce the criminal justice 
system to confine and then to prosecute an innocent defendant.... There is no moral, 
constitutional, common law, or common sense difference between providing phony 
evidence in support of an arrest and providing phony evidence in support of continued 
confinement and prosecution. Even if there were no case directly on point imposing 
liability on officials whose falsification of evidence occurred at the post-arrest stage, an 
official in Ms. Gilchrist's position could not have labored under any misapprehension that 
the knowing or reckless falsification and omission of evidence was objectively 
reasonable"); Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th 
15 
Cir. 1999) ("Officials cannot reasonably assume that the law permits them to obtain a 
custody order in retaliation for a parent's retaining counsel and through reckless omission 
of probative facts to a magistrate.55); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("Construed liberally, the allegations of judicial deception may state a claim that the 
deputies deliberately or recklessly incorporated known falsehoods into their reports, 
criminal complaints and warrant applications. If this claim were true, then the deputies' 
sworn representations as to the existence of probable cause would be perjury, or close to 
it, and perjury is not objectively reasonable conduct.55) 
Similarly, if a jury finds that a defendant's actions were motivated by personal 
reasons, such finding would preclude the defendant from arguing that a reasonable 
official could believe such actions to have been in furtherance of a "compelling state 
interest.55 This principle would apply, for example, if a jury found that: 
• Wagner's actions were at any point motivated by personal affront at the 
Jensens5 questioning of his recommendations, or by his initial desire to enroll Parker in a 
clinical trial. 
• Cunningham declined to do an investigation because she felt overworked 
or simply did not like doing investigations (hence her subsequent actions in going back 
and padding her hours, making up activities that she did not even perform). 
• Eisenman5s actions were based on a personal agenda. 
• Albritton5s actions were due to a personal bias against the Burzynski 
Clinic or in favor of her close colleague Wagner. 
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• Anderson's acknowledgement that the Jensens were not neglectful 
parents, but that "We can't have it over. It's gone too far," reflected that the continuation 
of the proceedings had become political in nature. 
With respect to Cunningham and Anderson, one does not have to speculate as to 
what a reasonable official could have believed about the requirement of an investigation, 
because the state legislature had expressly told them. No reasonable official could claim 
she thought it was narrowly tailored conduct, or a fair process to perform no investigation 
at all, and instead to rely solely upon an accusing doctor to explain the parents' reasons -
much like relying on an ex-wife in a bitter divorce to articulate the husband's side of the 
story. Cunningham knew that, unlike typical litigation, juvenile court proceedings are 
not adversarial, and DCFS - as the body charged with investigating reported abuse - is 
presumed by the courts to be neutral in its presentation, thus conferring more weight 
upon the factual assertions of DCFS employees. Cunningham admits that she knew this, 
and that her sworn statements in no way met that standard. 
Cunningham went even further, adopting and representing as her own "personal 
knowledge" the reporting doctor's accusations as if she had investigated them. These 
sworn statements enabled both the initiation of the juvenile court proceedings and, for 
later affidavits, the transfer of custody, and continuation of warrants. No reasonable 
official could consider such conduct to be a "narrowly tailored" means of furthering a 
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compelling state interest, nor consistent with a well established right to "due" process and 
reasonable conduct.8 
With respect to Anderson, as discussed above, this Court has repeatedly held that 
imposing a standard whereby the state requires parents to prove that their child-rearing 
decisions are "better" than the State's is unconstitutional. See pp. 9-10, supra. That this 
concept applies to medical decisions is both obvious and the unanimous conclusion of all 
courts that have addressed the issue. Id. 
B. No Other Remedies Were Available 
The State of Utah voluntarily dismissed its petition for transfer of custody before a 
final ruling was ever issued. Nevertheless, the defendants have previously suggested that 
the Jensens could have appealed from the orders of the juvenile court. But which 
order(s)? 
The June 20 hearing on the 2-day summons continued the matter. The July 10 
hearing ended with a stipulation that the Jensens would receive independent testing from 
the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles, the results of which the parties were still 
awaiting when the State obtained custody of Parker. The July 28 hearing reiterated that 
no final recommendations would be made until L. A. Children's reported its test results, 
which never happened; moreover, minutes of the July 28 hearing were not even available 
8
 Defendants have repeatedly claimed that the Jensens had their day in court before a 
neutral, objective, and independent decision maker. What the defendants fail to 
recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker does not have the full breadth of 
evidence before him, and is acting under the impression that the state has performed at 
least its minimum mandatory duties, the proceeding can never be "fair." 
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until August 11 - three days after custody had already been transferred - and no written 
order was entered until August 15. Only five days later, on August 20, the juvenile court 
ordered more testing, set a discovery cutoff of September 29, 2003, and scheduled a 
hearing "on the merits" for October 8-10, 2003. What would or could the Jensens have 
appealed, and with sufficient time to obtain relief? The fact that the State Defendants 
began aggressively pursuing arrest warrants and felony charges on August 8-13, before 
there was even an appealable order regarding the commencement of chemotherapy 
(entered August 15) illustrates the flaw in any suggestion that an appeal could have 
alleviated the defendants' constitutional violations. 
No other statutory or administrative remedies were available to the Jensens. Cf. 
Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 2004 UT App 405, 103 P.3d 716 
(plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies under the transportation regulations of 
the Utah Administrative Code). 
C. Equitable Relief Would Not Redress the Jensens' Injuries 
For longer than this country has been organized as a collective union, legal 
scholars have recognized the importance of providing a remedy for the violation of a 
constitutional right. In Federalist Paper No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
... there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to 
constitutional provisions. ... No man of sense will believe that such 
prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power 
in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. 
As Chief Justice Marshall observed in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, a right 
without a remedy is not a right. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Without 
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the availability of a remedy, a constitutional right is but a hollow shell protecting the 
citizenry in name only. In the absence of a means to punish state actors for violating the 
Utah Constitution and to provide residents with redress for such constitutional injury, the 
state constitution will never deter egregious conduct or protect the rights of citizens. See 
Deseret Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398 , 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) ("All wrongs are 
regarded as merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy is to put the injured party 
in the same position as he was before the wrong was committed"). 
Defendants argued to the district court that the Jensens have sufficient redress for 
their state constitutional violations through their common law claims. No supporting 
analysis was provided, nor does any come to mind. Moreover, allowing ordinary 
common law claims to trump state constitutional claims evinces a disregard for the state 
constitution. If no remedy were available for violation of independent rights guaranteed 
by the Utah Constitution, that would greatly weaken the efficacy of the constitution. 
The defendants argued in the federal court that unspecified "equitable relief 
might have redressed the Jensens' injuries. They did not articulate what equitable 
procedure would have gotten Daren Jensen his job back, or unlocked the handcuffs on his 
wrists, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or reimbursed their jail bond, or salvaged their 
reputation, or erased their emotional distress. No form of equitable relief could or can 
compensate the Jensens for their losses. Violation of constitutional rights cannot always 
be effectively remedied by injunctive relief. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, \ 25. Id., citing 
Bott ("if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not 
be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries") and citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
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(1979) (damages were appropriate remedy for unconstitutional termination in light of fact 
that her former employer was no longer a Congressman). 
In Spackman, this Court cited the court's observation in Rockhouse Mountain 
Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 1986) that 
"damages are an inappropriate remedy for a constitutional violation where the alleged 
injury 'can be undone' by the judiciary." The harm suffered by the Jensens cannot be 
"undone"; they can only be made whole after the fact, as the Framers would have 
intended. This is particularly true when the rights violated were fundamental, and a 
damages award would serve as a greater deterrent to such deprivation. Non-existent, 
speculative equitable relief is not an adequate remedy for the harm suffered in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, in the Jensens' earlier briefing, and at oral 
argument, the Jensens respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment of the trial 
court, and remand this matter for trial. 
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